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I.
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
All the parties to this proceeding are identified in the
caption.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

The Utah Supreme

Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals on or
about June 6, 1994.
V.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are:
1.

Has the plaintiff/appellant demonstrated that the

evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict?

The

standard of review for this issue is whether, when "viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict."
Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991).

Crookston v.

The appellate

court must assume the jury believed the evidence and inferences
that support the verdict.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781

P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989).

If the appellant fails to properly

marshal the evidence, appellate courts refuse to consider the
appeal and summarily affirm the trial court.

Oneida/SLIC v.

Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah
App. 1994).
2.

Has plaintiff/appellant waived any claim of improper

jury contact?

Defendant/appellee agrees with plaintiff that the

proper standard of review for this issue is whether the trial
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court abused its discretion.

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-39

(Utah 1994).
3.

Was there any prejudicial appeal to "sympathy," and is

plaintiff now barred from raising this issue because it was not
included in plaintiff's Docketing Statement?

The standard of

review for this issue is whether the trial court abused its
discretion.

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State

v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
The determinative rules are Rules 59(a) and 61 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Addendum, Tab A.)
VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings. Disposition in
the Lower Court
This is a child dart-out case.

On October 27, 1989, then

four-year-old Reynold Johnson, III darted out on his bicycle from
the west side of the paved north/south main highway in Manti,
Utah and pedalled his bicycle into the side of a trailer being
towed by Mr. Michael K. Coons behind Coons' northbound motor
vehicle.

Johnson filed suit in the Sixth Judicial District Court

in and for Sanpete County, suing Coons for alleged negligence.
In June 1993 the parties entered into a Stipulation and Motion,
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reduced to the trial court's Order, to try the case on liability,
only, damages agreed upon in a fixed amount if liability
attached.

(See Stipulation, Motion and Order in the Addendum at

Tab B; Record at 60-61.)

Liability was tried to a jury on

August 4, 5, and 6, 1993. The jury found, on a Special Verdict,
that defendant Michael K. Coons was not negligent.
Tab C; Record at 213.)

(Addendum,

Judgment was entered on the Special

Verdict in favor of defendant, and against plaintiff, no cause of
action.

(Addendum, Tab D; Record at 218-19.)

trial motions were duly denied.

Plaintiff's post-

(Addendum, Tabs E, F and G;

Record at 273-75, 291-93, 327-28.)

This appeal followed.

The

Utah Supreme Court duly transferred this appeal to this honorable
Court.
B.

Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for
Review
On October 27, 1989 defendant Coons was driving his van

northbound on the main north/south state highway through Manti,
Utah.

Coons was towing a trailer behind his van.

Coons was

going 30 miles an hour, 5 miles below the speed limit.

(Tr. Vol.

I, pp. 199-200.)
Plaintiff Reynold Johnson, III, then four years old, darted
out on his bicycle from the west side of the highway.

Johnson

pedalled his bicycle into the side of the trailer being towed
behind Coons' northbound motor vehicle, resulting in personal
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injuries to Johnson.1

In his closing argument to the jury,

plaintiff's lawyer, Mr. Wells, admitted that the child, Johnson,
rode his bike into the side of the trailer being towed behind
defendant Coons' motor vehicle as it proceeded northbound.
("'The boy hit us,' he says.
him [defendant Coons]."

Sure, he [plaintiff Johnson] hit

(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 564, lines 17.)

Coons

was, at all times, in the proper lanes for northbound traffic.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 206.)

Coons never, at any time, exceeded 30 mph

in the 35-mile-per-hour zone.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 200.)

Johnson

travelled from west to east until Johnson ran into the side of
Coons' trailer.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 180, lines 7-9.)
VIII.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY
VERDICT.
Plaintiff has not, as plaintiff is required to do,
marshalled the evidence that supports the jury verdict.
evidence supports the verdict.

The

Plaintiff's theory of the case

consists of erroneous notions of law and fallacious arguments
independent witness Rolland Bagley testified:
Q:

Then the boy on the bike ran into the
trailer; is that the way it was?

A:

Yes.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 180, lines 7-9.)
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rejected by the jury.

The mere fact that an accident happens

does not mean, as plaintiff is convinced, that Coons was
negligent.

Coons did not have a duty to "slow down."

Coons did

not have a duty to lock in his undivided attention, to the
exclusion of all else on and around the roadway, to the
plaintiff.

Plaintiff urges that on different facts there would

have been no accident, and that consequently the court must find
that defendant Coons was negligent.

Plaintiff's "reasoning" is

just another form of the unpersuasive conclusion that if none of
us ever drove motor vehicles, there would never be motor vehicle
accidents.

The trial court properly denied plaintiff's motions

for directed verdict, J.N.O.V., and new trial.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF IMPROPER JURY
CONTACT.
Plaintiff's "evidence" of improper jury contact consists of
the affidavits of plaintiff's lawyer/guardian, the legal assistant for plaintiff's lawyer/guardian, and plaintiff's mother, all
of whom were present throughout the jury trial. All complained
of conduct they allege they witnessed before the jury deliberated, yet none complained until a month after a jury verdict that
did not please them.

Plaintiff waived any claim of improper jury

contact.
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POINT III
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL APPEAL TO
"SYMPATHY."
Plaintiff has "unclean hands" to complain about "sympathy."
The extremely minute portion of defendant's opening statement,
not closing argument, about which plaintiff now complains was not
a "sympathy" argument.

At trial plaintiff either blessed or

waived what he now condemns.

The trial judge gave the jury

repeat instructions to not decide the case on sympathy, and
defense counsel at trial also asked the jury to decide the case
on the facts, not sympathy.

Finally, if there was any jury

sympathy for defendant Coons, it resulted from the abusive,
protracted examination of Coons by plaintiff's counsel in front
of the jury, not from any prejudicial appeal to sympathy.
IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY
VERDICT.
A.

Plaintiff Has Not. As Required. Marshalled the Evidence that
Supports the Jury Verdict.
In Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah

1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that on an appeal based on
alleged insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence must be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (in
this case, defendant Coons), and that the appellant must first
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marshall the evidence in support of the verdict, and only then
proceed to show that the evidence is insufficient.

This,

plaintiff has utterly failed to do, omitting, among a great many
other things, testimony of two defense accident reconstruction
experts, including Captain Knight's expert opinion that the only
thing Coons could have done that he didn't do to avoid this
accident was be "clairvoyant."

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 468, lines 3-

23.)
In Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc.. 872
P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994), this Court specifically refused to
consider the appeal and summarily affirmed the trial court
because the appellant failed to marshal the evidence in support
of the trial court's findings.2

2

This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that
appellate courts "do not sit to retry cases submitted
on disputed facts.". . . Accordingly, "[w]hen the duty
to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to
consider the merits of challenges to the findings and
accept the findings as valid.". . .
Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's factual findings. Rather
than bearing its marshalling burden, Oneida has merely
presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of
trial testimony in support of its position. Such
selective citation to the record does not begin to
marshal the evidence; it is nothing more than an
attempt to reargue the case before this court--a tactic
that we reject. • . . Because Oneida has failed to
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings, we hold that those findings are accurate and
affirm the trial court's dismissal based on those
findings.
Id. at 1053 (citations omitted).
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In late December 1994, plaintiff filed his Brief on Appeal
from a three-day jury trial in August 1993, complaining first,
foremost, and primarily of alleged "insufficiency of the
evidence" to support the verdict, yet plaintiff has made no
attempt to comply with this most rudimentary "marshaling"
requirement of appealing on this ground, despite frequent and
repeated guidance from the appellate courts of this state on this
point.

This Court should follow Oneida and summarily affirm the

trial court and refuse to consider this appeal.
B.

The Evidence Supports the Verdict.
The only issue for the jury was whether Coons was negligent.

(See Stipulation, Motion and Order to try the case on liability
only at Addendum, Tab B; Record at 60-62.)

Although it is

plaintiff/appellant's, not defendant/appellee's, burden, to
marshal the evidence that supports the verdict, defendant will
set forth some of the evidence that supports the verdict:
1.

Captain Knight testified without objection that it was

his expert opinion that the only thing Coons could have done that
he did not do to avoid the accident was be "clairvoyant."

(Tr.

Vol. II, p. 468, lines 3-23.)
Captain Knight also testified that Coons' accident avoidance
efforts were proper.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 467, lines 5-7).

Incredibly, Mr. Wells solicited Captain Knight's opinion
that the accident was Johnson's fault:
Q:

All right. So basically what you're saying is--is
that this accident is Reynold Johnson's fault?
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A:

I--that's what I've said all along. The boy moved
out. He hit us in the side. We were almost past
him. If you change those relative positions and
those relative times, we don't know what would
have happened. But we know that the collision
occurred because he comes in to the trailer when
we're--we are up there going on past him.

Q:

Are you aware--

A:

There's no question about that.

Q:

Are you aware of the fact, Newell, that the Court
has ruled already that Reynold Johnson has no
fault in this?

A:

I know what the statute is, as well as you do, Mr.
Wells, because I know what the presumptions are.
But I also know what boys do and when I do
accident reconstruction, I look to see what people
do wrong, regardless of what the presumptions are
under the CODE.

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 507 and 508.)
2.

Coons testified that he was "attentive" (Tr. Vol. I, p.

250, line 12), that he "was as attentive as any other driver
would be" (Tr. Vol. I, p. 250, lines 7-8), that two other cars
"darn near" hit Johnson (Tr. Vol. I, p. 241, lines 1-2), and that
the only way he, Coons, could have avoided the accident was if he
had been looking at Johnson at the moment Johnson started across.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 240, lines 20-21.)
3.

Dave Stevens' expert testimony provided a reasonable

basis for the jury to conclude that Coons was not negligent:
A:
Ah, because, ah, particularly with boys on
bicycles, they're very unpredictable. There are many
things that are unpredictable as we drive our cars on
the highway. If you're driving down the highway and
somebody on the opposite side of the road as pedestrian
steps off the roadway and implies there's a possibility
of that he will cross the street, that does not start
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an emergency mode in the mind of the driver of the
vehicle because there is an extremely high probability
that person will take appropriate action, allow the car
to go by before proceeding across the street or may not
even proceed across the street.
By the same token, with a boy on a bicycle, their
actions are so unpredictable that when a driver
observes a buy [sic] on bicycle, generally speaking,
unless it is a--a close enough proximity to create an
immediate obvious emergency, the driver will go into a
sort of a "wait and see mode, wherein "I'm gonna keep
on eye on that boy, but I'm not going to make any
changes or--or make any decisions until I see more
information."
And in this case, particularly if a boy rides from
the opposite side of the street, ah, once again
applying human factors from studies and understanding
driver behavior, the driver is not going to begin
responding to the actions of this boy until the boy
gives, I guess you could say, body language signals
that he is, in fact, intending to cross the street.
Because kids will ride out onto the street and we all
have had it. I mean I don't think there's a person in
this room that hasn't experienced the puzzlement of
wondering what a child on a bicycle is going to do.
* * *

Q
I understand. Would you consider it prudent
to start slowing down when you see him start to run?
A

Perhaps.

But not always.

Q
In other words you ought to just leave your
cruise control on and go ahead?
A

It happens all day every day many times.
* * *

Q
I want you to assume that Mr. Coons testified
that for two to three seconds he was looking at mirrors
and doing things, other than looking at the field of
vision in front of his vehicle as he approached the
corner, having previously seen children on both sides
of the street, and I want you to tell me whether, as a
safety expert, you believe taking your attention away
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from what's going on in front of you for that period of
time is a prudent thing for a driver to do.
A

It is because it's normal procedure.

Q
So you think it's prudent to give--take two
to three seconds away from your attention in front of
you and do something else. And then what happens if
during that two to three seconds a child--one of those
children darts into the road?
A
It is not possible to view children on the
west side of State Street and 4th North and children on
the east side of State Street and 4th North at the same
instant, so there must be movement of eyes. And--and
in my opinion, a high school education driving
instructor will tell you that your eyes should be
constantly moving.
Q

I understand that.

A
Okay. Now it is very possible that a person
can be looking at a child on the right, because this
child constitutes, in the eye or in the mind of this
driver, a greater hazard than the child on the left.
Q

Okay.

A
And at that point, if the child on the left
starts into the street and darts across, then you see
the driver's what we might call a sitting duck because
he was being a prudent driver at the time. By the same
token, every driver is expected to keep his eye on his
mirrors. He can look in his mirrors without being a
negligent driver.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 381, line 17 through p. 282, line 20; p. 416,
lines 14-19; p. 419, line 4 through p. 420, line 11.

(Emphasis

added.)
More of Stevens' testimony that constitutes sufficient
evidence for the jury verdict is set forth infra at pp. 17-18.
4.

Rolland Bagley testified that "the boy on the bike ran

into the trailer . . ."

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 180, lines 7-9.)
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5.

Jamie Johnson, plaintiff's sister, gave testimony that

poked gaping holes in the plaintiff's theory of the case that the
child Coons first saw on the side of the street was Johnson.
From Jamie's testimony, it was entirely reasonable to conclude
that the child Coons first saw was not Johnson, but one of the
other children, and that Johnson darted out, unabated, from north
to south on the west side of the street, then, with no stop, from
west to east across the main highway,
Q
There's been a little confusion here about a
piece of paper. Maybe you can help us out. I'd like
you to take a look at this piece of paper that's been
marked as EXHIBIT 34, and my question to you is real
simple. Did you draw that?
A

Yes.

Q

Is that your signature there, Jamie?

A

Yes.

Q

10-3-89?

A

Yes.
* * *

Q

Was it your best recollection at the time?

A

Yes.

It was.

Q
Jamie, does your drawing show the path of
your brother from the gazebo on up to the minute--or
the second the accident happened?
A

I believe so.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 194, line 23 through p. 195, line 25 and Exhibit
34, in Addendum at Tab H.)

If there ever was a case that presented a jury question,
this case was it. The jury did its best.
full and fair day in court.
plaintiff.

The plaintiff had a

The jury simply found against the

For all the reasons presented herein, the judgment

should be affirmed.
C.

Plaintiff's Theory of the Case Consists of Erroneous Views
of Law and Fallacious Arguments Rejected by the Jury.
The "Facts" portion of Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal is not

made up of "facts" at all, but is simply a rehash of plaintiff's
theory of the case.
Plaintiff argues that "uncontroverted evidence" shows that
the time necessary for plaintiff to traverse the roadway was more
than sufficient to allow defendant to react and avoid an
accident.

The jury obviously found to the contrary.

Plaintiff argues that the physical evidence did not coincide
with Mr. Coons' testimony.

Again, this is plaintiff's theory of

the case--it is obviously not what the jury concluded.
Plaintiff relies on Holmes v. Nelson. 326 P.2d 722 (Utah
1958), a 37-year old case, which was decided not only prior to
the Liability Reform Act of 1986, but also fifteen years prior to
the Comparative Negligence Act of 1973. A major difference
between the Holmes case and this case is that in the Holmes case
the defendant saw the child leaving the sidewalk after the
southbound car (not the defendant's car) passed the children.
"Defendant saw the children himself when he was 200 feet south of
where the child was struck.

A car approached from the north and
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defendant observed the children move back to permit the
southbound car to pass.

Defendant's car and the southbound car

passed at a point about 100 to 125 feet south of the point of
impact."

Id. at 723.

The Court: After this car passed you going the
other way you saw the child. Then where was the child
when you first saw it after the car passed you?
A
The child was coming off the sidewalk north
of the Holmes' driveway.
The Court:
that time?

He was how far off the sidewalk at

A
Off the sidewalk, oh - directly off the road
probably 10 or 12 feet.
The Court:
the road?

10 or 12 feet off the sidewalk or off

A
Off the road. He was just leaving the
sidewalk when I observed him the first time.
Id. at 724.
Thus, in the Holmes case, the defendant saw the child come
off the sidewalk and come on into the street for some
considerable time and distance.

In this case, however, defendant

Coons did not see the child until the child had actually darted
substantially across the southbound lanes.
Moreover, there was a fundamental question for the jury as
to whether the child that Coons saw off to the west side of the
street as he approached from the south was in fact the child that
actually darted out sometime later, i.e., Reynold Johnson.

The

testimony of Reynold's sister, Jamie Johnson, and her diagram
created shortly after the accident must be kept in mind.
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Jamie

clearly had Reynold darting all the way from the gazebo on the
northwest corner of the intersection clear on across the street.
Again, plaintiff's Brief is just another recitation of
plaintiff's theory of the case, which the jury didn't have to
agree with and obviously did not agree with.
1.

The mere fact that an accident happened does not mean
Coons was negligent.

Plaintiff states as a "fact" that "the evidence clearly
shows the accident was preventable."

Plaintiff's lawyer, Mr.

Wells will go to his grave believing that if there is an
accident, that someone must be at fault.
contrary.

The law is to the

The Court instructed the jury to the contrary. Mr.

Wells took no objection to the Court's instruction that the mere
fact that an accident happened does not, in and of itself, mean
that any party was negligent.
Plaintiff argues that to support the jury's verdict in this
case, one would have to say that the evidence preponderates in
favor of a finding that the accident was unavoidable.

This

fallacious argument is simply not so. Accidents do not have to
be "unavoidable" for a jury to find that neither party was
negligent.

The statement that to support the jury's verdict in

this case one would have to say that the evidence preponderates
in favor of a finding that the accident was unavoidable is what
Mr. Wells wants the law to be, not what the law is or should be.
If this statement were true, any time a plaintiff files a
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Complaint the defendant would have the burden of showing that the
accident was unavoidable.
2.

This is simply not the case.

Coons did not have a duty to "slow down.11

The trial court gave extensive, comprehensive instructions
on "negligence."

(See Instructions 13K-13W, Record at 171-183,

Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 528-32; Addendum at Tab I.)

Plaintiff's

counsel took not a single objection to any of the trial court's
instructions.

(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 572, lines 24-25.)

The "duty"

defined by the instructions is one of "reasonable care,"
"greater, extra care for children than adults," a "proper
lookout," a "reasonable and prudent" speed, etc.

it was not, as

plaintiff argues, a duty to "slow down."
3.

Coons did not have a duty to lock in his undivided
attention on the plaintiff to the exclusion of all else
on and around the roadway.

The discussion of the trial court's instructions contained
in the immediately preceding paragraph applies equally to this
erroneous argument of plaintiff.

Plaintiff wants to characterize

defendant's testimony that he checked his mirrors as defendant
"removing his eyes from the road."

Every person who has driven a

vehicle knows that when you check your mirrors that even though
your eyes are not focused straight ahead down the road, you still
have a consciousness of what lies ahead of you.

If this were not

so, drivers would be taught to never check their mirrors instead
of being taught to regularly check their mirrors.
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Plaintiff's Brief argues that all experts admitted that the
accident could have been avoided if defendant had begun to react
when plaintiff entered the roadway.

This is not so.

Even if it

were so, it begs the question as to whether Coons was negligent.
Mr. Stevens gave clear expert testimony, to which plaintiff
raised not a single objection, that had Coons, as plaintiff
claims he should have, honed his focus in solely and exclusively
on young Reynold Johnson, that he would have been negligent by
ignoring other potential hazards.
Q
And my question to you, sir, is as a driver
sees northbound on a highway through a town like Manti,
what should that driver be observing as he proceeds
northbound up the road?
A

Primarily be observing the road.

I see that Mr. Coons has placed it would
southbound vehicles in the--in his drawing. Ah, he
shows other children on the southeast corner.
Apparently this is the boy's sister.
[INDICATED]
He cannot be--ah--relied upon--or he cannot
be--or it cannot be demanded or expected of him that he
concentrates soley fsicl on Ren, who is over at
position B.
[INDICATED]
He has an entire field of vision to take into
consideration and, ah, I've seen too many accidents
where, ah, there are other possible accidents occurring
or potential accidents. You can't--you can't just look
at something like this by hindsight and say that should
have been concentrated on because there were other
possibilities equally as serious as this one.
Q
And what if a driver did focus on iust one
object in his entire field of vision, for example like
focusing soley fsicl on Ren at point B?
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A

He would be negligent.

Q

What way?

A
In failing to take into consideration the
other factors in his field of vision, the other two
vehicles, the other children such as that, because all
of that presents potential hazard.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 383, line 2 through p. 384, line 6.)

(Emphasis

added.)
4.

Conclusion.

That different facts may have led to no accident is not
evidence that Coons was negligent; it is nothing more than a form
of the unpersuasive conclusion that if none of us ever drove
motor vehicles, there would never be motor vehicle accidents, or
that if Coons had stayed in bed that day, there would have been
no accident.
The jury was perfectly free to reject plaintiff's "facts."
The jury was perfectly free to reject plaintiff's fallacious
arguments.

The jury was perfectly free to arrive at the

reasonable conclusion that Mr. Coons was not negligent.
D.

The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motions for Directed
Verdict. J.N.O.V.. and New Trial.
1.

Introduction.

Although plaintiff moved pursuant to subparagraphs 1, 2, 6,
and 7 of Rule 59, subparagraphs 2 and 7 were not involved.
Subparagraph 2 of Rule 59 governs misconduct of the jury.
Plaintiff presented no evidence at the trial court, and still
presents none, that there was any misconduct of the jury.
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Subparagraph 7 of Rule 59 addresses "error in law." Plaintiff
presented no evidence at the trial court, and still presents
none, that there was any "error in law,"
Thus, plaintiff is left with a Rule 59(6) claim that the
evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict.3
2.

Applicable Law.

The opening clause of Rule 59 states "Subject to the
Provisions of Rule 61 . . . "
Error."

Rule 61 is captioned "Harmless

Significantly, the case law on Rule 61, and thus Rule

59, squarely and clearly places the burden on the party making
the motion to show not only that an error occurred, but also that
it was substantial and prejudicial, and that the movant was
deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration.4
Further, the case law clearly establishes that judgments are
presumed valid, that all presumptions are in favor of the
validity of a verdict and judgment, and that the presumption
arises that the judgment should not be disturbed unless the
movant meets the requirement of showing that the error is
substantial and prejudicial and that there is reasonable
3

Plaintiff also tacked on a Rule 59(1) claim based on an
alleged "irregularity" by defendant Michael K. Coons in an
alleged "improper contact" with the jury in an alleged "attempt
to ingratiate defendant with the jurors and create an improper
rapport" (emphasis added), but even plaintiff didn't allege that
the "attempt" was successful, or that the alleged conduct made
any difference in the result. The alleged improper jury contact
is discussed fully in POINT II, below.
4

Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987); Onyeabor v. Pro
Roofing Inc... 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990).
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likelihood the result would have been different in the absence of
such error.5
Finally, the case law provides that it is the duty of the
Court to disregard errors unless there is error both substantial
and prejudicial and a reasonable likelihood the result would have
been different without it. and that the burden is on the movant
to show not only that there was error, but also that the error
was prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different
result.6
3.

Holmes v. Nelson.

Plaintiff relied almost exclusively on the case of Holmes v.
Nelson. 326 P.2d 722 (Utah 1958).

Plaintiff reads entirely too

much into the case of Holmes v. Nelson, which simply stands for
the proposition that the granting of a new trial is largely a
matter of discretion with the trial judge and that the trial
judge's decision will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion.

The two justices in the Holmes concurring opinion,

5

Leiah Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah
1982); Hall v. Blackham. 417 P.2 664 (Utah 1966); Joseph v. W.H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp.. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1960)
6

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah
1991); Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983);
Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Inv.. Inc.. 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah
1974); Batt v. State. 503 P.2d 855 (Utah 1972); Ewell & Son. Inc.
v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 493 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1972); Ortega v.
Thomas. 383 P.2d 406 (Utah 1963); Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande
R.R.. 286 P.2d 240 (Utah 1955)
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Justice Crockett and Justice Wade, pointed out as much.

They

noted:
That such prerogative [of granting a new trial]
should be exercised with caution and forbearance
consistent with his important and imperative duty to
safeguard the right of trial by jury. The verdict,
when supported by substantial evidence, should be
regarded as presumptively correct and should not be
interfered with merely because the judge might disagree
with the result. The prerogative should only be
exercised when, in the view of the trial court, it
seems clear that the jury has misapplied or failed to
take into account proven facts; or misunderstood or
disregarded the law, or made findings clearly against
the weight of the evidence so that the verdict is
offensive to his sense of justice to the extent he
cannot in good conscience permit it to stand.
Id. at 726 (emphasis added).

The dissenting judge, Justice

Henroid, totally disagreed with the granting of the new trial.
4.

Plaintiff's Affidavits.

The Affidavits submitted by plaintiff were from obviously
highly biased and prejudiced litigants - the guardian, himself a
trial lawyer by trade; the guardians' legal assistant, obviously
motivated to please his boss; and the plaintiff's mother, obviously motivated to do everything she possibly can to try to help
her own son.

(Record at 223-28.)

The Affidavits submitted by

plaintiff were sadly mistaken on even the basic facts. The trial
started on August 4, 1993 and lasted three days.

August 5, 1993,

was the second day of trial, not the first day, as Mrs. Johnson
swears.

The instructional hearing in chambers was on Thursday

afternoon, August 5, 1993, the second day of the trial. The
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third and last day of the trial consisted of arguments, instructions, and deliberations, only.

There was no instructional

hearing in chambers on the third and last day of the trial.
Defendant's Affidavit, on the other hand, established that
the conversation apparently complained of was between him and the
bailiff, not the jurors, and that a juror interjected an innocuous comment as to the location of two people.

(See Affidavit of

Defendant, Record at 253-55; Addendum at Tab J.)

For the reasons

set forth below, such conduct does not, as a matter of law, rise
to the magnitude of justifying a new trial.
5.

Plaintiff Failed to Meet Plaintiff's Rule 59 Burden of
Showing Substantial Prejudice and the Reasonable
Likelihood that the Result Would Have Been Different.

Plaintiff's post trial motions were nothing more than sour
grapes about a jury verdict that went against plaintiff.
Plaintiff utterly failed to meet plaintiff's Rule 59 motion
burden.

Plaintiff failed to show substantial error and

prejudice.

Plaintiff also failed, as is plaintiff's burden, to

show the reasonable likelihood that the things plaintiff complained about made any difference to the verdict.
The alleged "church mission" discussion is innocuous.

It is

certainly no less harmful than what came out in voir dire--that
one of the venire had worked with Mrs. Johnson, the plaintiff's
mother, at "the temple."

(Presumably the LDS Temple in Manti).

It is also no less sympathy arousing than having both the devoted
mother, Mrs. Johnson, and the plaintiff, a freshly scrubbed,
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beautiful boy, with coloring book and story books, present at
counsel's table adjacent to the jury box throughout the entire
trial, even though plaintiff's counsel obviously never intended
to call either as a witness.
If Coons' conduct were so substantial and prejudicial, or if
there were any reasonable likelihood that it made any difference
to the result, one has to wonder why the plaintiff's mother
and/or the plaintiff's own court appointed guardian, a lawyer by
trade, didn't call it to the Court's attention during the trial,
or, for that matter, until more than a full month after the jury
returned its verdict.
Plaintiff's affiants all claim it happened right in front of
their eyes--yet they did nothing about it at the time, and never
called it to the Court's attention until more than a month later,
after the jury had been discharged.

It just won't wash--their

inaction belittles any claim of substantiality and prejudice and
any claim it made any reasonable likelihood of a different
result.
In California Fruit Exch. v. Henry. 89 F. Supp. 580 (W.D.
Pa. 1950); aff'd. 184 F.2d 517 (3d. Cir. 1950), one of the cases
discussed in Brief of Appellant, the appellate court refused to
grant a new trial, holding that a court should not grant a new
trial in the absence of intentional wrong where the communication
between a party and the jury did not involve the case.
90.

Id. 588-

In this instance, the alleged communication did not involve
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the case. Thus, the Henry case cited by plaintiff actually
supports the position of defendant Coons.
In Groen v. Tri-O-Inc.. 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the only evidence admissible to impeach a
jury verdict is that which demonstrates that the verdict was
determined by chance or resulted from bribery and all other proof
as to what was said or done in the jury room, including evidence
that the jury was confused or that it misunderstood or disregarded the facts or the applicable law, is inadmissible as
violative of the policy against attempts to undermine the
integrity of verdicts. A fortiori the same result should be
reached in our case.
In Crookston. supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that on a
new trial motion based on alleged insufficiency of the evidence,
the evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party (in this case, defendant Coons), and that the
movant must first marshall the evidence in support of the
verdict, and only then show that it is insufficient.

This

plaintiff utterly failed to do so, omitting, among a great many
other things, testimony of two defense accident reconstruction
experts, specifically including Captain Knight's opinion that the
only way Coons could have avoided this accident was by being
"clairvoyant.n
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6.

Conclusion.

If there ever was a case that presented a jury question,
this case was it. The plaintiff had a full and fair day in
court.

The jury simply found against the plaintiff.

For all the

reasons presented herein, the trial court properly denied plaintiff's motions for directed verdict, J.N.O.V., and new trial.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF IMPROPER JURY
CONTACT.
A.

Plaintiff's Affidavits.
The alleged "evidence11 of improper jury contact consists

entirely of the affidavits of Andrew Berry (plaintiff's attorney/
guardian), Liesl Draper (Mr. Berry's legal assistant), and Doreen
Johnson (plaintiff's mother).

(See Affidavit of Andrew Berry,

Affidavit of Liesl Draper and Affidavit of Doreen Johnson, all
filed September 7, 1993. Record at 223-28.)
Each affidavit indicates that each affiant was aware, prior
to the time the jury was instructed, and while the judge and
trial lawyers were in chambers working on jury instructions, that
the alleged improper contact between defendant and jury members
occurred.

Berry Affidavit at 1 3; Draper Affidavit at 1 3; and

Johnson Affidavit at 11 3 and 4.
Neither plaintiff's lawyer/guardian, the lawyer's legal
assistant, plaintiff's mother, nor anyone else informed the Court
of the alleged improper contact, or objected in any way to the
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alleged improper contact, until one month after the jury verdict
when plaintiff filed his motion for new trial, after a verdict
adverse to plaintiff.
B.

Plaintiff Cannot Become Aware of Alleged Improper Contact.
Wait for the Jury Verdict Without Informing the Court of the
Improper Contact, and Then Move for a New Trial Based on the
Alleged Improper Contact When the Verdict is Adverse.
The rule by overwhelming weight of authority is that an

objection to improper contact with the jury must be made as soon
as possible, or it is waived:
As a general rule, if a party obtains knowledge
during the progress of the trial of acts of jurors, or
acts affecting them, which he shall wish to urge as
objections to the verdict, he must object at once, or
as soon as the opportunity is presented, or be
considered has having waived his objections.
See 89 C.J.S. Trial § 483.

Compare Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198

(Utah App. 1989) (where plaintiff failed to object to trial
court's failure to ask voir dire questions before jurors were
empaneled, he could not raise the issue for the first time in a
motion for a new trial); and Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776
P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989) (female defendant's claim she was
denied fair trial because of country's preemptory challenges to
women jury members would not be considered on appeal where
defendant failed to present the issue to the trial court until
after return of adverse verdict).
For example, in Bernier v. National Fence Co.. 410 A.2d 1007
(Conn. 1979), the court and parties became aware during trial
that a juror had seen a newspaper article concerning the details
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of the case.

The court interviewed the juror that had seen the

article and concluded that the juror's exposure to the article
resulted in no prejudice.

The parties made no objection.

Subsequently, after the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant, the plaintiff obtained the article and discovered it
contained a reference to a worker's compensation lien.

Plaintiff

filed a motion for new trial on the grounds that the jury had
been prejudiced by the juror's exposure to the article's outside
influence.

The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, the Supreme Court noted in pertinent part as
follows:
The record reveals clearly that the plaintiff was
timely put on notice that a newspaper article of
potentially prejudicial content was published and read
by one of the jurors. If the plaintiff believed, for
any reason, that the court's cautionary instructions to
the jury or to the panel as a whole were insufficient,
it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to make a request
for such remedial action as was felt necessary, at that
time, and not to reserve possible objections until
after an adverse verdict was rendered. . . .
. . . A motion for a new trial for extrinsic causes
will not be sustained if the ground for it existed at
the time of trial and was either known to the
petitioner at the time of trial, or might have been
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence.
See 410 A.2d at 1008-09.

See also Fontaine v. Federal Paper

Board Co., 434 N.E.2d 331, 339 (111. App. 1982) ("Only after the
defendant became aware that the jury had ruled against it and was
deliberating on damages did it make an objection or move for
mistrial,w and thus the defendant waived its objections).
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The reasons for such a rule are obvious. As the court
stated in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 223
So. 2d 332 (Fla. App. 1969):
Had the plaintiff's counsel made a timely objection, the
trial court would have been given an opportunity to correct
its error, if any in fact had occurred. By waiting until
the jury returned its verdict before objecting, we think the
plaintiff waived its right to object.
See 223 So. 2d at 333.

See also Martin v. Atherton. 116 A.2d 629

(Maine 1955) ("A party is not permitted to take his chance of a
favorable verdict, and then, if it is adverse, interpose an
objection to it based on facts which were known to him before it
was rendered.").
In this case plaintiff's own affidavits make clear that
plaintiff knew full well of the alleged improper contact between
defendant and the jury.

But plaintiff waited until after the

Court completed its instructions to the jury, until after an
adverse verdict was returned, until after the jury was
discharged, and indeed, until one month later before raising the
issue in the motion for new trial.
Plaintiff's actions thus prevented the Court from learning
the scope of the alleged contact on the spot, from being able to
correct any alleged problems with a cautionary instruction, and
prejudices both the Court, the parties and the jurors allegedly
involved by purporting to require a subsequent evidentiary
hearing now that plaintiff has learned the verdict was adverse.
Plaintiff's objection to the alleged improper contact between
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defendant and the jur\ is untimely

WJH waived, and should not

now be the basis of any motion for new trial.
C.

Utah Law is Clear that the Issue Plaintiff Now Attempts
to Raise has been Waived.
Utah law is very clear that "issues not raised in the trial

court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding this court
[the Court of Appeals] from considering their merits on appeal."
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App

1Q89)

"It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on
appeal, the record must clearly show that it was timely presented
to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling
thereon."

Id. at 655.

With regard to alleged improper jury contact, the rule is
that "a motion for a new trial for extrinsic causes will not be
sustained if the ground for it existed at the time of trial and
was either known to the petitioner at the time of trial, or might
have been known through the exercise of reasonable diligence."
See Bernier v. National Fence Co., 410 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1979)
(emphasis added).
in thip case, M?

Well's argument is apparently that he has

not waived his objection to the alleged contact between defendant
and
a

- v:r
.-•-.

because although the plaintiff's attorney guardian
T

-v

j:'*a.^

r

the contact before the jury was

instructed,

Wells, personally, was not aware of the contact

at that time

Nevertheless, as the Court i t se3 f noted ::i n i ts

Nc ivember 4, 1993, Order:

The named plaintiff in this case, Andrew B. Berry# Jr.,
is an attorney, licensed to practice law in the State
of Utah and currently practicing, oft-times before the
undersigned. Consequently, he would have knowledge
about the proper relationship between parties and
jurors.
See Order of November 4, 1993, at p. 2.
Clearly the circumstances of this case are such that
assuming there really was some prejudicial contact between
defendant and jury members, plaintiff and his trial lawyer
"should have known of the misconduct through the exercise of
reasonable diligence."

Indeed "there can be but little

difference, in legal effect, between actual knowledge . . . by
the [movant for a new trial], at the time of trial, and
their . . . negligence in not ascertaining it. And it would be
unjust to subject the [movant for a new trial] to a new trial, by
reason of such negligence."
D.

Bernier, 410 A.2d at 1009.

Conclusion.
In this case, plaintiff's guardian attorney and his trial

attorney either admittedly knew, or should have known, about the
alleged contact between defendant and the jurors, and clearly did
nothing about it while the Court still had an opportunity to
instruct the jurors. Rather, they waited to determine whether
the verdict would be adverse to them before objecting.

Under the

circumstances, Utah law is clear that they have waived their
objection, and the alleged contact between defendant and the jury
cannot now be the basis for any motion for a new trial.
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POINT III
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL APPEAL TO
"SYMPATHY. ff
A

Plaintiff Waived this Issue by Not Including It in the
Docketing Statement.7
Several cases from the appellate courts of this state have

indicated that the failure of an appellant to preserve an issue
in the Docketing Statement constitutes

waiver of the issue and

a bar to the appellate court considering it on appeal. See,
e.g.. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.. 882
P.2d 1143, 1144 r i 1 (Utah 1 994); Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs..
Ltd.. 735 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1987); C.M.C. Casity. Inc. v. Aird.
et al.. 707 P.2d 1304# 1305 (Utah 1985); Brooks v. Department of
Employment Security, 736 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1987) .

7

The plaintiff not only didn't raise the issue in the
Docketing Statement, but also failed to raise this issue in his
post-trial motions to the trial court. Plaintiff raised only two
issues in his post-trial motions. They are found at page 2 of
plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Post-Trial Motions, Record
at 232, a copy of which is in the Addendum at Tab K. The only
two issues raised were:
ISSUES
The following issues are raised by this Mot:ion:
1.
verdict?

Was the evidence insufficient to support the

2
Was the contact between defendant and members
of the jury during the trial improper and irregular and
sufficient to justify a new trial.
Id.
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In this case, the plaintiff utterly failed to raise the
"sympathy" issue in his Docketing Statement.

A copy of page 4 of

the plaintiff's Docketing Statement is included at Tab L of the
Addendum.

It sets forth, at 1 8, the following issues:
8,

Issues presented for review.

(1) Was the evidence sufficient to preclude
a finding of no negligence by the jury?
(2) Was the contact between Coons and
members of the jury during the trial improper and
irregular and sufficieot to justify a new trial.
(3) Should the Court have granted
plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict or Motion for
Judgment N.O.V.?
(4) Can a Court rule there was no unavoidable accident, and then allow the jury to rule there
was no negligence?
Nowhere is there any reference to the "sympathy" issue the
plaintiff now attempts to raise.

This is another example of

plaintiff's failure to comply with the basics of appellate
practice, but rather, attempt to present issues seriatim.
Plaintiff has waived the "sympathy" issue by failing to raise and
preserve it in the Docketing Statement.
B.

Plaintiff Has Unclean Hands to Make this Argument.
Plaintiff has unclean hands to complain about any jury

appeal to sympathy.

Plaintiff's entire case was of passion and

sympathy, rather than logic and reason, in the hope that,
although plaintiff pedalled his bike into the side of defendant's
trailer, the jury would nevertheless feel sorry for plaintiff and
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give him money

Some of the examples of plaintiff's appeals to

sympathy include:
1.

Little Reynold Johnson, III and his mother were present

at counsel's table in front of the jury throughout the entire
trial, even though neither was ever called as a witness.
Vol. I, p

(Tr.

1 8, 1 :i oes II ~ 10 and p. 19, lines 20-22 and p

20, lines

5-8.)
2.

Mr. Wells did call Reynold Johnson, Ill's 15-year-old

sister (12 at the time of the accident) as a witness at trial.
Mr. Wells' examination of her is found at pp. 189-194 of Tr. Vol.
I., and had marginal, if any, relevance.
Mr. Wells opportunities

It did, however, give

her she had to speak up, even

though "it's hard" and she is "nervous."

It also gave her the

opportunity to cry in front of the jury.

M . at 191.

3

In his closing argument, Mr. Wells referred to Reynold

Johnson, III as "cute."
C.

(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 559, line 7.)

It Was Not a Sympathy Argument.
Mr. Coons was not feeling well the first day of the trial.

The trial judge so told the jury.

(Tr. Vol. I., p. 169, line 24

through p. 17 0, 1ine 1.)
After Mr. Wells insisted on calling Coons as a witness that
day, it was necessary to have Coons explain to the jury on crossexamination that he * a s not in the same shape on the day of his
alleged inattentiveness that allegedly caused the accident as he
was four years later on the day he testified to the jury.
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Therefore, the following testimony was given, without a single
objection from the plaintiff:
Q

How are you feeling today, Mr. Coons?

A

Pretty sick.

Q
Were you in the kind of condition on October
27th of 1989 that you are today?
A

No, sir.

Q

How were you feeling on October 27th of 1989?

A
I was feeling like I was when I first came
into this courtroom, which was healthy. But I only
have a lasting power of about two hours and then my
disabilities begin to show.
Q
And what was it that caused you your
disability?
A

I had a parachute malfunction from 800 feet.

Q

And that was at Fort Bragg in 1983?

A

Yes, sir.

I was an infantry captain.

Q
Can you tell me how many major operations
you've had on your body?
A

13.

Q
Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen of
the jury what happens to you when your--what did you
call them? Your--?
A

The post traumatic.

Q
No. Your maintenance, after a couple of
hours you said started to what-THE COURT:

The word he used was "disabilities."

MR. HENDERSON:

Your disabilities, yeah.

WITNESS: My mind clouds. I stutter. I can't
connect thoughts together to be able to be expressive.
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I have a masters degree in business, but it hasn't; done
me much good since the accident.
(Tr. Vol. i, t

*6, line 23 through p. 248, line 3.)

Defense counsel's opening statement was nothing more than an
explanation why Mr. Coons was not in the same shape on the day of
his alleged inattentiveness that allegedly caused the accident as
he was four years later when he appeared in front of the jury.
The opening statement simply told the jury what the evidence
would be on that point (which said evidence was later received
without a single objection from plaintiff).

"It is well settled

that trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence are not
to be overtur ned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988).

The entirety

of the opening statement that plaintiff now complains of is set
forth here:
You may have observed Mike Coons has been here in
the courtroom today, but he doesn't look too good
today. He didn't sleep last night and he went to the
hospital at 5:00 o'clock this morning and got a shot of
demerol. And he's in pain and this stems from a
parachute accident he had when he was on active duty in
the-MR. WELLS: Your Honor, I'm goi ng t :o object.
is a ploy to sympathy.

This

MR. HENDERSON: It's not a ploy for sympathy.
It's an explanation of why he doesn't look too good
today and why he's in pain, because I'm sure that--and
I won't dwell on it. I'll briefly touch on it and then
move on. It's certainly no more than his effort at
sympathy.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Overruled.
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You can continue.
MR. HENDERSON:

Thank you.

He had a parachute accident in 1983 when he was on
active duty in Fort Bragg in the 82nd Airborne
Division. He was seriously injured. He's had 13
surgeries and he does have a lot of pain.
In October of 1989 he was between surgeries and he
was feeling fairly well and it should have been a happy
day for him and it started out a happy day.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 114, line 21 through p. 115, line 18.)
Thus, the only thing plaintiff objected to was the reference
in opening statement, not testimony or closing argument, to
Mr. Coons' pain that resulted from a parachute accident.

It was

not an appeal to sympathy, but was, rather, a preview of the evidence why Coons appeared as he did to the jury, and to contrast
that with his condition on the day of the accident four years
earlier.

It later came into evidence through the testimony of

Mr. Coons without a single objection.
The admissibility of evidence is so far within the
discretion of the trial court that it will not be overturned
absent abuse of discretion.

Griffiths, supra.

This cannot

seriously be argued to constitute abuse of discretion.

The law

of this jurisdiction is that a trial court's ruling on whether
counsel's conduct warrants a mistrial will not be overturned
absent an abuse of discretion.
(Utah 1988).

State v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186

Surely the innocuous introductory remarks of

counsel in opening statement regarding what the evidence is going
to be about a party's appearance in court as opposed to the day
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of the accident is -: • * rounds for a inist:r™ia 1, and the trial
judge's overruling

the objection to the comments was within

his discretion.
D. ftt Trial. Plaintiff Blessed or Waived What He Now Condemns.
Cases are legion holding that a party may not, on appeal,
complain about something at the trial court
acquiesced d n, tacit] y concurred

-

l

>e party invited,

.t -

= position on appeal

inconsistent with the position taken in the trial court. See,
e.g.. Estate of Justheim v. Ebert. 824 P.2d 432, 43 6 (Utah App.
1991); Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 78 7 E 2d 52 5

52 7 (Utah

App. 1990); Samaden Oil Corp. v. The Corp. Comm'n of the State of
Oklahoma, 755 P.2d 664, 668 'Okl. 1988).
It Is important to consider plaintiff's action and inaction
in the trial court to the things he complains of here, with this
legal principle in mind.
1.

In his closing argument, Mr. Wells referred t~

Mr. Coons' "unfortunate accident" and that Mr. Coons "doesn't
feel well and is disabled."
2.

iTx

Vol

III, | . 5"i»9( lines y lu I

Even though Mr. Coons was quite sick on the first day

of the trial, Mr. Wells insisted on calling him as a witness that
day.

(Tr. Vol

I p

19'; >
" (l line

front of the jury, "We may need
we can get him here."
3.

When,

If 1J

We I I B then stated

take a five-minute recess so

(13. at lines 4-5 )
appear, Mr

We3 1 s stated on hi s own,

volunteered, in the presence of the jury, "I think it will be

in

easier for Mr. Coons if the Clerk could administer the oath
without him having to get up again."

(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 198,

lines 10-12.)
4.

After the Court accepted Mr. Wells' invitation for

Coons to take the oath without rising,1 and after Coons stated he
would tell the truth, the Court and Mr. Wells had the following
colloquy:
THE COURT: I'm satisfied that he's taken the
oath. Are you, Mr. Wells?
MR. WELLS:

That's fine.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 198, lines 18-20.)
E.

The Judge Gave the Jury Repeat Instructions to Not Decide
the Case on Sympathy and Defense Counsel Asked the Jury to
Decide the Case on the Factst Not Sympathy.
In defense closing argument to the jury, defense counsel

told the jury:
The question for you is was Mike Coons negligent?
Or was he not? If you find he exercised reasonable
care, the answer to that question is he was not
negligent.
I need your help on this. I need your vote on
this. Not out of as maybe Mr. Wells has suggested some
time during this trial, not out of sympathy for Mike
Coons. But because it's the right result, based on the
evidence. And I do want you to decide this case on the
evidence and the law given to you by the Judge.
*On appeal, plaintiff makes the crass and undignified
allegation that this somehow indicates that the trial judge was
sympathetic to Coons. If anything, the trial judge was
sympathetic to the plaintiff, as evidenced by the trial court
refusing to award defendant $1,120.55 in uncontested taxable
costs. (See Memorandum of Costs, Record at 214-217, Addendum at
Tab M; Judgment on Special Verdict, Record at 219, Addendum at
Tab D.)
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Really my only worry in this case is that you'll
decide this case based on sympathy, compassion, and
preiudice. I want you to decide it on the evidence,
and the right result on the evidence is this accident
was not the fault of Mike Coons. It just wasn't.
(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 557, line 20 through p. 558, line 8.)
(Emphasis added )
Prior to the evidence, the trial judge gave the jury
extensive preliminary instructions,
1 ] 8 120 )

(Tr. Vol. I, pp

103-107 and

These :i nsti: uctions specifica] 1 y I ncl uded the

instruction "Consider the evidence fairly, without any bias or
sympathy toward either side."

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 119, lines 5-6.)

(Emphasis added )
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court gave
the jury instructions that fill up pages 522 through 533 of Tr.
Vol. 111.

These instructions specifically included the instruc-

tion, "You must weigh and consider this case without regard to
sympathy, preiudice. or passion for or against any party to the
action."

TTT

* : . lines 8-10.)

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff's counsel took not a single objection to any of

the t r i a l c o u r t ' s instructions

(Tr

Vo.l . I l l , p, i>/2, ] i nes

4-

25.)
F.

If There Was Any Jury Sympathy for Coons, it Resulted from
the Protracted, Abusive Examination of Coons by Plaintiff's
Counsel in Front of the Jury.
If the jury did have any sympathy for Mr. Coons# it was only

because of Mr. Wells' protracted, abusive examination of

Mr. Coons as a witness. After Mr. Wells had already grilled
Mr. Coons extensively9 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 199-245), and after
9

For example, after already grilling Mr. Coons repeatedly,
Mr. Wells and Mr. Coons had this interchange:
A

To get the first two cars to slow down, yes,

Q

And you didn't see him do that?

sir.

A
No, sir. When I heard the commotion I turned
and looked and saw that he was there and when I did, I
shifted into the righthand lane, honking and stepping
on my brake.
Q
Is there some reason why you couldn't see him
just before you heard the commotion?
A
Huh-huh.
second to do that.
Q

He wasn't moving.

It only takes a

One second?

A
Please, let's not be that specific.
that good at kind of time. None of us are.

I'm not

Q
Well what I'm trying to get you to admit,
Mr. Coons, is that there was some period of time out
there where he went from a dead stop to full speed when
you weren't watching him.
A
Sir, we don't know that he was at full speed,
but we could have him ride a bike and see.
Q
fast.
A

Well, you testified that he was going really
Yes, sir.

But I didn't say "full speed."

Q
All right. But from a dead stop to really
fast and you didn't see that happen?
A
He had to go really fast to get that far
across the intersection to hit my trailer.
Q

And you didn't see that happen?
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Mr. Coons cried when he told the jury, "You don't--you haver
been involved with accidents with kids and just walk away.n
Vol. T

n_ 549, lines 13 17.)

Mr. Wells insisted on standing up

on re-direct examination and pointlessly grilling Mr. Coons:
Q
Don't you think it would have helped if you'd
have been paying attention to where you could see Ren
start up and start to come into the street?
A
Please, Mr. Wells, I tried and I was as
attentive as any other driver would be. And I felt the
pain of that mother and her son and the rest of those
children for a long time. Please don't do this any
more.
Q
person.
A

Mr. Coons, I'm not saying you're a bad
I wa s attentive.

Q
What I'm saying is I think you made a mistake
and I think the mistake was that you weren't looking
ahead of your vehicle as you should have been. And I'm
asking you if you had seen Ren start up and come out
into that street, don't you think there's something
more you might have been able to do?
A
Yes, si r. I've told you and you've told me
when I saw him out the side. The trooper explained to
you, too, that I saw him out my side window and I moved
over out of the way and braked at the same time, hoping
to avoid a collision with the young man. And apparently, according to the other testimony, even though he
had bad brakes he put his feet on the ground to try and
stop, too.
Q
stop.

So he was trying to stop; you were trying to

A
If he wasn't going very fast, he wouldn't
have had to worry about dragging his feet to stop. I
don't know why we have to drag him through this anyway.
He's a sweet young man and it seems like we are just
beating this out.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 228,

(Tr.

line 1 to p. 229, line 14.)

MR, HENDERSON: Your Honor, I'm going to object.
He's been over this and over it and over it and the
witness has answered it.
THE COURT: I think that's asked and answered.
That objection is sustained.
We'll instruct you not to answer that question.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 250, lines 4-24.)
X.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff had his day in court.

The jury fully heard and

rejected all of the unpersuasive arguments that the plaintiff now
attempts to re-hash here.

In view of the basic facts of the

case, i.e., the plaintiff pedalled his bicycle into the side of
the trailer being towed behind defendant's motor vehicle, it is
not at all surprising that the jury would conclude that the
defendant was not negligent.

To the contrary, it is a highly

foreseeable result on these facts.

Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdict.

Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any other

meritorious, persuasive argument as to why plaintiff should get a
second bite at the apple.

Plaintiff waived any claim of improper

jury conduct, and there was no prejudicial appeal to "sympathy."
This Court should affirm the judgment on the Special Verdict in
favor of defendant, and against plaintiff, no cause of action.
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January, 19 95.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEK

4ARTINEAU

By
Robert H. Henderson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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Civil Procedure

Tab B

Stipulation, Motion and Order to Try the Case on
Liability, Only (Record at 60-62.)

Tab C

Special Verdict (Record at 213.)

Tab D

Judgment on Special Verdict (Record at 218-20.)
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Tab A

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the'
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

TabB

,:

' 21 L ;s

ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as
guardian for and on behalf of
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor
child,

STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No.

0920600128

MICHAEL K. COONS,
Judge David Mower
Defendant.

STIPULATION AND MOTION
The plaintiff, by and through his guardian and by and
through his counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through
his counsel of record, hereby stipulate to try this case on
liability only, submitting the case to the jury on a special
verdict form which shall pose two questions:
1.

Was Michael K. Coons negligent? (and if
the answer is flyesfl)

2.

Was the negligence of Michael K. Coons a
proximate cause of the injuries of
plaintiff?;

and, in the event the jury answers yes to both questions, to
settle the case for $100,000.

The parties move the Court for an

Order in accordance with this Stipulation.
DATED this

,?_r~<iay of June, 1993.
ROBERT J

& ASSOCIATES

ID T. WELLS'
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

H. Henderson
Attorneys for Defendant
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ORDER

The court having reviewed the file, and having met with
counsel for the parties and the guardian for and on behalf of
Reynold Johnson, III, a minor, and being fully advised in the
premises, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:

this case will

proceed to trial on August 5, 1993, on liability only.

In the

event the jury finds that Michael K. Coons was negligent and that
his negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries,
upon presentment of an appropriate Petition for Settlement of a
Minor's Claim, the Court will enter an appropriate Order
approving the settlement in the amount of $100,000 agreed to by
the parties.
DATED this

day of June, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

,/

>,..

DAVID'L. MOWER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TabC

o Ffl Z 32
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SANPETE COUNTY

UJl!MiL,.^'-.
Andrew B. Berry, Jr., as
guardian for and on behalf of
Reynold Johnson III, a minor
child,
Plaintiff,
SPECIAL VERDICT
vs.
Case number 920600128
Michael K. Coons,
Judge David L. Mower
Defendant.
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, we, the jury, find
as follows:
1.

Was the defendant, Michael K. Coons, negligent?
Yes
s''

No

(If you answered "No" to question number 1, then your work
is finished. Sign the verdict and notify the bailiff.)
2.

Was the negligence of Michael K. Coons a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries?
Yes
No

Signed on August

ir

, 1993.
/

Jury Chair

TabD
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ROBERT H. H E N D E R S O N (A1461)
SNOW, C H R I S T E N S E N & M A R T I N E A U
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, E l e v e n t h Floor
Post Office B o x 4 5 0 0 0
Salt Lake City, U t a h
84145
Telephone:
(801) 5 2 1 - 9 0 0 0
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T C O U R T IN A N D FOR SANPETE

COUNTY

STATE OF U T A H

ANDREW B . B E R R Y , JR., as
guardian for and on b e h a l f of
REYNOLD JOHNSON, I I I , a m i n o r
child,

JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL V E R D I C T

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil N o .

0920600128

M I C H A E L K. C O O N S ,
Judge David M o w e r
Defendant.

This case h a v i n g come on r e g u l a r l y for jury trial on A u g u s t
4, 5, and 6, 1993, and the jury h a v i n g answered the Special
Verdict:
1.

W a s the defendant M i c h a e l K. Coons

negligent?
Yes
No

x

NOW, T H E R E F O R E , b a s e d thereon, it is h e r e b y O R D E R E D ,
A D J U D G E D , A N D D E C R E E D that:

Judgment b e , and h e r e b y is entered

in favor of defendant and against p l a i n t i f f , n o cause of action,

and that defendant be, and hereby is awarded costs in the amount

of $ a CO

o>

\s-

DATED this

day of August, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

I- Udili*

DAVID.-«OWER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

i

.x
Apprc*ted*as ta-~f.ortii: <F
ROBERT J . TteSW?" & ASSOCIATES

Edward T. Wells
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
for defendant herein; that she served the attached Proposed
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT (Case Number 0920600128, Sixth
Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County) upon the
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof
in an envelope addressed to:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
and causing the same to be hand-delivered on the

el
Q
J_

day of

August, 1993.

Donna Campbell
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

to before me this ^X^

day of August,

1993.
IBLIC
yy
NOTARY RUBLI
Residing in the Sta

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
JANEEN BEAQLEY
#10 Eichanft Pttm #1100
Saft Ufc» Cfty. U * i $4111
ftfy Co»«***on Expires

*rfyt1,1t#4
•TATE OF UTAH

TabE

ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

\J .

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as
guardian for and on behalf of
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor
child,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.

0920600128

MICHAEL K. COONS,
Judge David Mower
Defendant.

Plaintiff!s Motion for JNOV and Motion for New Trial came on
regularly for a hearing on September 27, 1993.

The plaintiff was

represented by Edward T. Wells of the law firm Robert J. DeBry &
Associates, the defendant was represented by Robert H. Henderson
of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau.

The Court had

fully reviewed the Motion, Memoranda, and Affidavits on file.
The Court fully heard more than an hour of oral argument on the
pending Motions.

The Court considers itself to be fully

informed.
The Court is of the opinion that this case presented fact
questions for the jury, and that the evidence is sufficient to

support the jury's verdict.

Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT

HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for JNOV be, and hereby is denied;

2.

Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial based on the alleged

insufficiency of the evidence be, and hereby is denied.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's Motion for a New
Trial based on the alleged improper conduct of the defendant be,
and hereby is set down for an evidentiary hearing at 3:00 p.m. on
November 17, 1993, at which the Court will hear live testimony,
under •flact^/• fljpm the four affiants on file.
*•

TDATEb tteCf-^V -

I ! i - •- s\

]

day of October, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

•
' ' «

V

\

-•

' ,,/ ?

DAVID L. MOWER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Appf\¥mMti"*f —to form:

ROBERT DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

By
Edward T. Wells
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

: ss.
Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
for defendant herein; that she served the attached Proposed ORDER
(Case Number 0920600128, Sixth Judicial District Court in and for
Sanpete County) upon the parties listed below by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
w

w^

d

a a y 0 f September, 1993.

Tonna Campbell
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /?}Cv
September, 1993

day of

r\
Vft-YMruY.( V t O h
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah

My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
CONNIE CALO
10 Excftango Plaeo. 11th Fi
Salt la** city. Utah 841 p
My Commission Expires
Stptsmoo* 2.1997

STATS OP UTAH
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SANPETE COUNTY
--•
160 North Main, Manti, Utah 84642
^JA
Telephone (801) 835-2131 Facsimile (801) 835-21
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as
guardian for and on behalf of
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor
child,
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON MOTIONS (l)FOR
EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OF
MOTION TO VACATE
EVIDENTIARY HEARING and (2)
TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY
HEARING
VS.

Case number 920600128
MICHAEL K. COONS,
Judge David L. Mower
Defendant.
Defendant's motion for Expedited Disposition of Motion to
Vacate Evidentiary Hearing is granted.

The Motion to Vacate

Evidentiary Hearing set for November 17, 1993 is granted.

All

counsel should inform their witnesses that appearance on November
17, 1993 is not required and that the hearing has bsen vacated.
The sole remaining issue to be decided by the Court in this
case is described generally by the phrase "improper contact
between parties and jurors."

However, a more specific

description of the issues perhaps would include phrases such as
"waiver," and "imputed knowledge" and "timing."

I will attempt

to explain in more detail.
9311041.M

Berry vs. Coons - 920600128
ORDER ON MOTIONS (1) FOR EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OF MOTION TO VACATE
EVIDENTIARY HEARING and (2) TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY HEARING, Page 2
Plaintiff has claimed that there was improper contact
between the defendant and some jury members during a time when
the Court was in recess, but the Judge and the lawyers were in
chambers working on jury instructions.

Affidavits describing

these contacts have been provided by Andrew B. Berry, Liesl H.
Draper and Doreen Johnson.
Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Wells, claims that he didn't bring
the matter of improper contacts to the Court's attention until
after the verdict because he didn't know about them.
The named plaintiff in this case, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., is
an attorney, licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and
currently practicing, oft-times before the undersigned.
Consequently, he would have knowledge about the proper
relationship between parties and jurors.
Because of that situation, I would like Mr. Wells to provide
me with a brief or a memorandum which helps to answer these
question:

Why shouldn't the plaintiff's knowledge about improper

contacts be imputed to plaintiff's counsel? And, if plaintiff's
counsel had knowledge about the improper contacts, doesn't it
constitute a waiver of any claim based thereon if plaintiff fails
to bring the matter to the Court's attention before the matter is
9311041.1*

Berry vs. Coons - 920600128
ORDER ON MOTIONS (1) FOR EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OF MOTION TO VACATE
EVIDENTIARY HEARING and (2) TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY HEARING, Page 3
submitted to the jury for decision?
Unless Mr. Wells requests an enlargement of time, I will
deny his motion for a new trial, completely and in full, based on
ile on December 1, 1993.
the mfi*8!?ffilM3^\«tf^ich I have in the file

^£/^a^5^^ N o \^ e r _ — '

1993

'

'Jm.lu^D a v i d L. Mower, Judge
\ w ^ f o ^ ^ ^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On November _ £ _ _ , 1993 a copy of the above ORDER ON MOTIONS (1) FOR
EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OF MOTION TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY HEARING and
(2) TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY HEARING was sent to each of the following by the
method indicated:
Addressee

Method

(Mail, in Person, Fax)

Addressee

Method

fMail, in Person. Fax)
V—

Mr. Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY &
ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

UK

Mr. Robert H. Henderson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Fl.
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

' 1
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M
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^ ^ DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SANPETE COUNTY
160 North Main, Manti, Utah 84842
Telephone (801) 835-2131 Facsimile (801) 835-2121
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as
guardian for and on behalf of
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a ainor
child,
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL
vs.

Case number 92060&12B

MICHAEL K. COONS,

Judge DAVID L. MOWER

Defendant.
Plaintiff's aotion for a new trial is denied.

The aotion

was based on alleged improper contacts between defendant and soae
Jurors during a time when the Court was in recess but before the
natter had been submitted to the jury for decision.
The aotion is denied because plaintiff failed to raise the
issue in a tiaely fashion.

Failure to object on a tiaely basis

constitutes a waiver of the claiaed error.
,^T SiMii&&jfaanuary

If /

1

. 1994.

^C^'
d L. Mower, Judge
CERTIFICATE flF SFRVICE

•»•: \0r» Januay&fyr/l
. 1994 a copy of the above ORDER ON MOTION
F$R A^s^^EU-:P^fic^S5as sent to each of the following by the aethod
inefl^at»di •£&*-;"

ORDER ON MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, Case nunber 920600128, page -2flddressee

Method

(gail, infrrson,[ax)

Mr. Edward 6. Wells
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

C*a

Addressee

M e t h o d (Mail, infrrsnn,[ax)

Mr. Robert H. Henderson
10 Exchange Place 11th
Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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1

control to prevent it from running over Renyold Johnson;

2

failing to keep a proper lookout for pedestrians; failing to

3

yield the right of way to a pedestrian; traveling too fast

4

for existing conditions; and failing to operate his vehicle

5

at a safe speed to allow him to stop without running over

6

Renyold Johnson; failing to exercise appropriate caution

7

upon observing children close to the roadway; failing to

8

reduce speed at an intersection; failing to reduce speed in

9

the presence of pedestrians; failing to exercise appropriate

10

care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian.

11

To return a verdict for plaintiff Renyold Johnson

12

you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that

13

Michael K. Coons was negligent and the negligence of Michael

14

K. Coons was an proximate cause of injuries to Renyold

15

Johnson.

16

No. 13K.

Negligence is the failure to do what a

17

reasonable and prudent person would have done under the

18

circumstances or doing what such person under such

19

circumstancess would not have done. The fault may lie in

20

acting or in omitting to act.

21

No. 13L.

You will note that the person whose

22

conduct we set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily

23

cautious individual nor the exceptionally skillful one, but

24

a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. While

25

exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and

jm\jct

^i£*?

1

encouraged, the law does not demand them as a general

2

standard of conduct.

3

No. 13M.

A person must exercise greater care for

4

the protection of young children than adults.

One dealing

5

with children must anticipate the ordinary behavior of

6

children, the fact that they usually cannot and do not

7

exercise the same degree of prudence for their own safety as

8

adults, that they are often thoughtless and impulsive

9 II imposes the duty to exercise a degree of vigilance and
10

caution commensurate with such circumstancess in dealing

11

with children.

12

No. 13M.

When a child is known to be in a

13

situation of possible danger, a driver has a duty to observe

n

extra caution for his safety.

15

negligence.

16

No. 130.

Failure to do so is

You are instructed that because of his

17 II age Renyold Johnson was not negligent--"--no.
18

"13P.

It is the duty of the driver of any

19

vehicle to exercise ordinary care at all times to avoid

20

placing others in danger and to obey all statutes,

21

ordinances, and rules of the road designed to promote

22 II

safety.

23
24

25

Failure to do so is evidence of negligence.
No. 13Q.

Every person operating a motor vehicle

|| must have the vehicle under reasonable control.

A vehicle

is under reasonable control when the driver is observing

PAGE 5 3 0

1

others using the road and has the ability to guide and

2

direct the course of the automobile, fix its speed, and

3

I] bring the automobile to a stop within reasonable distance.
In that regard every driver is obliged to keep a lookout for
bicyclists and highway conditions which reasonably may be
anticipated to keep the vehicle Under proper control, to

7

|| drive a safe speed having proper regard for the width,

8

|| surface, and condition of the highway, other traffic,

9

visibility, and any existing or potential hazards.

10

The law provides that any person--"excuse me.

11

This is No. 13H.

12

a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a proper

13

lookout.

14

an ordinarily careful person would use in light of all

15

present conditions and those reasonably to be anticipated.

16

A proper lookout includes a duty to see objects and

17

conditions in plain sight, to see that which is open and

18

apparent and to realize obvious dangers.

19

merely require looking, but also requires observing and

20

understanding other traffic and the general situation.

21

"The law provides that any person driving

A proper lookout means maintain the lookout that

No. 13S.

This duty does not

It is the duty of every person using a

22

public street or highway, whether as a pedestrian or as a

23

driver in a vehicle, to exercise ordinary care at all times

24

to avoid placing one's self or others in danger and to use

25

reasonable care to avoid causing an accident.

Vi\\j£*

^ J JL

1

No. 13T. UTAH CODE--"--that abreviation stands

2

for annotated, and that's probably a word that none of you

3

has ever seen before. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED is the collection

4

of all of the laws that's been passed by our legislature and

5

I'm gonna quota couple of laws for you.

6

that's referring to, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.

So that's what

"Section 41-6-46(1) provides in part as

7
8

follows:

A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed

9

greater than is reasonable and prudent under the existing

10

conditions, given regard to the actual and potential hazard

11

that existed, including when approaching and crossing, an

12

intersection and special hazards exist due to other traffic.

13

If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the

14

defendant conducted himself in violation of the statute just

15

read to you, which is proposed for the safety of Renyold

16

Johnson and persons in whose class he was at the time, such

17

conduct is evidence of negligence.

18

No. 13U.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 41-6-80

19

provides in pertinent part as follows:

20

motor vehicle shall give an audible signal when necessary

21

and exercise appropriate precaution upon observing any

22

child.

23

The operator of a

If you find from a preponderance of the evidence

24

that the defendant conduct--"--should say--"--conducted

25

himself in violation of the statute just read to you, which
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1

is proposed for the safety of Renyold Johnson and persons in

2

whose class he was at the time, such conduct is evidence of

3

negligence.

4

No. 13V.

Every driver has a duty to drive at a

5

speed that is safe under the circumstances with proper

6

regard for existing and potential hazards.

7

lirnit at the time of this accident was 35 miles per hour.

8

This speed limit is reasonable in the absence of any special

9

II hazards.

The posted speed

Speed in excess of the posted limit constitutes

10

evidence of negligence.

11

drivers must drive at an appropriate reduced speed when

12

approaching and crossing an intersection when the

13

pedestrians are present or when required to do so because of

14

weather or other special highway conditions.

15

No. 13W.

Regardless of the speed limit, all

Even if a driver complies with an

16

applicable statute, ordinance, or safety rule, this does not

17

|| make that driver immune from the duty to act with reasonable

18
19

care in other respects. One must always maintain a proper

20

lookout for other traffic and hazards reasonably anticipated

21

on the highway and keep one's car under proper control.

22

No. 13X.

It is your duty to make findings of

23

fact as to the questions I will submit to you.

In making

24

your findings of fact you should bear in mind that the

25

burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party
claiming the fact to be true. And that fact must be proved
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ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as
guardian for and on behalf of
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor
child,

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL K. COONS

Plaintiff,
VS.

Civil No.

MICHAEL K. COONS,

0920600128

Judge David Mower

Defendant.

Michael K. Coons, being first duly sworn, deposes and states
as follows:
1.

I am the defendant in this case.

2.

The facts stated herein are based upon my own personal

knowledge.
3.

I have read the Affidavits of Andrew Berry, Liesl

Draper, and Doreen Johnson in this case, all dated 6 or 7
September, 1993.
4.

The Affidavits are in error in a major way.

approached any member of the jury and engaged them in
conversation until after the trial was over.

I never

On one occasion, I was in the courtroom speaking with the
court bailiff about his job.

The conversation turned to the

current location of a person we both knew.

A juror, on the

juror's own, unsolicited by me or the bailiff, interjected that
the person the bailiff and I were talking about and her husband
were working for the church in Israel.

Nothing else was

discussed.
Further, affiant sayeth not.
I duly acknowledge that I have read the foregoing Affidavit,
understand the same, and that the contents are true of my own
knowledge.
DATED this /7

day of September, 1993.

MicHael K. Coons
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

On the / l
day of September, 1993, personally appeared
before me Michael K. Coons, the signer of the above instrument,
who, upon being duly sworn, acknowledged under oath that he had
read the foregoing, understands the same, and executed the same
as his own free act and deed.

Jotary Public
Residing in State of Ut
H lUUo^AttVlfkHlLic™
DONNA L CAMPBELL I
10 EMnwig* Pitt*

Hm
iwkw ctif, utin
ItyCommiMJonEx;:'
Jury 15. 1993
STATE OP UT .

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss,
)

Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
for defendant herein; that she served the attached AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL K. COONS (Case Number 0920600128, Sixth Judicial District
Court in and for Sanpete County) upon the parties listed below by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed
to:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the £A&

day of September, 1993

TX^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ o — d a y of
September, 1993.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
My Commission Expires;
NOTARY PUBLIC
Sharon McCormick
10 Exchangt Piaca 11m F\
Salt Laka City, Utah §4145
My Commission Expirts
Saptambar IS, 1997

STATE OF UTAH

TabK

On August 30, 1993, judgment in favor of defendant was
duly entered by the court clerk.
ISSUES
The following issues are raised by this Motion:
1.

Was

the

evidence

insufficient

to

support

the

2.

Was the contact between defendant and members of the

verdict?

jury during the trial improper and irregular and sufficient to
justify a new trial.
FACTS
1.

The accident in question happened at 400 North and

Main Street in Manti, Utah at approximately 6:00 p.m. on October
28, 1989.
2.

Main Street runs north and south in front of the

home of plaintifffs parents.
3.

The highway is 62% feet wide from curb to curb.

4.

There are two (2) southbound lanes, two (2) north-

bound lanes and two (2) parking lanes.
5.

The point of impact was approximately 8-10 feet west

of the eastside curb line.
6.

The speed limit was 35 miles per hour.

7.

Defendant was northbound at 25 miles per hour.

8.

Defendant saw plaintiff on the side of the road to
2

TabL

Judge, Coons had improper contacts with jury members.
of this contact is disputed.

The extent

Counsel for plaintiff did not become

aware of these contacts until after the jury had been dismissed.
The jury found Mr. Coons not to have been negligent in
any degree.
8.

Issues presented for review.
(1)

Was

the

evidence

sufficient

to

preclude

a

finding of no negligence by the jury?
(2)

Was the contact between Coons and members of

the jury during the trial improper and irregular and sufficient to
justify a new trial.
(3)

Should

the

Court

have

granted

plaintiffs

motion for a directed verdict or Motion for Judgment N.O.V.?
(4)

Can

a Court

rule

there was

no

unavoidable

accident, and then allow the jury to rule there was no negligence?
9.

Determination of Case bv Supreme Court.
This case involves issues of first impression which

should be resolved by the Supreme Court.
10.

Determinative Law.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46;
Utah Code Ann, S 41-6-80;
U.R-C.P.: Rule 59;
California Fruit Exchange v, Henry, 89 F.Supp. 580
(W.D.Pa. 1950);
Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722
(1958);
Kilpack v. Wicmall, 604 P.2d 462 (Utah 1979).

4
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ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as
guardian for and on behalf of
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor
child,

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.

0920600128

MICHAEL K. COONS,
Judge David Mower
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
ROBERT H. HENDERSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says that he is counsel for defendant in the above-referenced
action, and that to his knowledge the following costs are correct
and were necessarily incurred in this action:
CLERK'S FEE:
Jury Fee

subtotal

$

50.00

$

50.00

WITNESSES AT TRIAL:
Newell Knight, witness fee plus mileage $

79.50

David C. Stephens, witness fee plus
mileage

$

79.50

Allen Plant, witness fee plus mileage
and service of process on Allen
Plant

$

85.00

Jason Plant, witness fee plus mileage
and service of process on Jason
Plant

$

85.00

subtotal

329.00

DEPOSITIONS USED AT TRIAL
Michael K. Coons

$

48.75

Newell Knight

$

265.75

$

314.50

David c. Stephens

$

97.65

Doreen Johnson, Jamie Johnson and
Patrick J. Coons

$

329.40

subtotal

$

427.05

GRAND TOTAL

$ 1,120.55

subtotal
DEPOSITIONS ESSENTIAL TO PREPARATION
FOR TRIAL

jv

DATED this

\A day of August, 1993.

-2-

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
f

?/4fJJ&t

/O

dday

of

, 1993.
iotary Public
R e s i d i n g i n S a l t Lake

lonNDxpaCTisii,! -j
DONNA L. CAMr^^LL
S»t u>h» City, WieH ; •'
My Commission C July 15. ISSj"

CTATC or irr

-3-

ty,

Utah

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

: 85.

Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
for defendant herein; that she served the attached MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS (Case Number 0920600128, Sixth Judicial District Court in
and for Sanpete County) upon the parties listed below by placing
a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the fO

day of August, 1993.

Donna Campbell
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \Q

day of August,

1993
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the 27th day of January, 1995, I served
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee by
first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Edward T.

Wells, ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES, 4252 South 700 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84107.

Robert H. Henderson
Attorney for Appellees

